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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
The operation of nuclear facilities has, fortunately, not led to many  accidents with off-site
consequences. However, it is well-recognised that should a large release of radioactivity
occur, the effects in the surrounding area and population will be signiﬁcant. These effects
can be mitigated by developing emergency preparedness and response plans prior to the
operation of the nuclear facility that can be exercised regularly and implemented if an acci-
dent  occurs. This review paper details the various stages of a nuclear accident and the
corresponding aspects of an emergency preparedness plan that are relevant to these stages,
both  from a UK and international perspective. The paper also details how certain aspects
of  emergency preparedness have been affected by the accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi and
as  a point of comparison how emergency management plans were implemented following
the  accidents at Three Mile Island 2 and Chernobyl. In addition, the UK’s economic costing
model for nuclear accidents COCO-2, and the UK’s Level-3 Probabilistic Safety Assessment
code “PACE” are introduced. Finally, the factors that affect the economic impact of a nuclear
accident, especially from a UK standpoint, are described.
©  2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Institution of Chemical
Engineers. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1.  Introduction
Since the development of civil nuclear power in the 1950s, it
is fortunate that relatively few accidents have occurred with
off-site consequences. Such events are rare due to the effort
expended to provide the necessary preventive, protective, and
mitigative safety measures for all types of nuclear facility.
These measures span structures, systems and components
(SSC), along with the management of the facility. The poten-
tial for high-consequence accidents to occur, albeit with very
low probability, motivates the high ﬁnancial costs observed in
nuclear safety.
However, it is impossible to eliminate the possibility of acci-
dents with off-site consequences entirely. With each accident
∗ Corresponding author. Current address: NSG Environmental Ltd., Jessop Avenue, Cheltenham GL50 3SH, UK.
E-mail addresses: stephen.ashley@nsgconsultancy.com, sfashley@physics.org (S.F. Ashley).
that has occurred, our conception of what the overall impacts
associated with the accident, along with the policies and prac-
tices that are put in place to mitigate the consequences of the
accident, has been challenged. For instance, a recent analysis
has posited that, from an economic perspective, large-scale
permanent relocation of people within the evacuation zones
of Chernobyl has proven signiﬁcantly less optimal than an
alternative policy that could have been adopted: short-term
evacuation coupled with aggressive remediation followed by
a later return of those displaced (Waddington et al., 2017a).
Two examples of such challenges from the incident at the
Fukushima Dai-ichi in 2011 are as follows: (a) in the instance
of protracted radionuclide releases it has been suggested that
short-term sheltering may be detrimental if later evacua-
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2017.08.031
0957-5820/© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Institution of Chemical Engineers. This is an open access article
under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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tion is required (due to the potential for increased radiation
dose received whilst evacuating) (Gering et al., 2013); (b) that
whilst there have been no radiation-induced deaths from
the accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi, an estimated 1793 have
lost their lives during the subsequent evacuation and reloca-
tion (The Reconstruction Agency, 2014), with a much greater
number experiencing detrimental health effects (Yabe et al.,
2014).
Nuclear safety in most countries is assessed against the
ﬁve levels of the defence-in-depth philosophy (IAEA, 2012a) in
which the ﬁrst four levels rely mainly on SSC on the site. SSC
can be costly and, particularly if they are only required for
unlikely events, a decision has to be made on whether they
are cost effective.1 Off-site emergency preparedness is the
main mitigative safety measures in Level 5. However, although
such arrangements are generally benchmarked against inter-
national guidelines (e.g. IAEA, 2002a), signiﬁcant variations
are seen between different national policies depending on: (a)
their political acceptance, (b) public perception and aversion
to radiological risk, (c) public trust of the relevant authorities,
and (d) national approaches to dealing with civil contingen-
cies. Arrangements and approaches to emergency response
have changed over time and a synopsis of lessons that have
been learnt over the last 70 years can be found in IAEA
(2012b).
This paper reviews international guidance on emergency
preparedness and responses to accidents and provides a
review of the UK’s approach. Section 2 details current emer-
gency preparedness and response procedures and the effect
of events at Fukushima Dai-ichi on these guidelines. Section
3 details the UK’s approach to performing economic assess-
ments of nuclear accidents; whilst Section 4 outlines the
factors that affect the severity of a nuclear accident from
both health and economic perspectives and how these can be
assessed by a Level-3 Probabilistic Safety Assessment. For a
discussion surrounding the UK’s nuclear liability regime post-
Fukushima, the reader is referred to (Heffron et al., 2016).
This review considers the health and safety aspects
during an accident as well as remediation to reduce radia-
tion doses post-accident, paying due attention to economic
factors. Aspects such as decommissioning and disman-
tling of the facility, replacing the facility and/or the lost
electricity, are not included. Whilst these may be of sig-
niﬁcant concern to the licensee and/or government, they
do not impact directly on the risks from ionising radi-
ation to people and the environment (cf. the Safety
Objective in IAEA, 2006). In line with this consideration,
risks from conventional hazards have been considered
only where they result from actions to prevent radiation
doses.
This review article was prepared as a background paper for
the study of the likely effects of a major nuclear reactor acci-
dent in the UK, where Public Health England’s PACE program
suite and COCO-2 economic costing model (Charnock et al.,
2013; Higgins et al., 2008) was applied to assess the economic
and health costs of a hypothetical release from a ﬁctitious
1 In the UK, the requirement for not implementing additional
safety measures is the legal requirement to show that risks to the
health and safety of employees and people not in the employer’s
employ have been reduced so far as is reasonably practicable (see
e.g. Health and Safety Executive, 2001).
nuclear power station with realistic demography (Ashley et al.,
2017).
2.  Phases  of  an  accident
Emergency preparedness for a nuclear accident can be con-
sidered within three chronological phases: planning phase,
response phase, and recovery phase. The phases are not
entirely separate and the boundaries should not be viewed
as deﬁnitive as overlap can occur.
2.1.  Planning  phase
2.1.1.  Requirements
It is fundamental in all countries that there should be some
form of emergency planning and preparedness around nuclear
facilities in case an accident should happen. This require-
ment is generally enshrined in some form of legal enactment,
though this varies between countries as does the responsibil-
ity for drawing up these plans, assessing their basis, exercising
them and, if needed, implementing them. Internationally, this
is underpinned by Article 16.1 of the Convention on Nuclear
Safety (IAEA, 1994) which states: “Each Contracting Party shall
take the appropriate steps to ensure that there are on-site and
off-site emergency plans that are routinely tested for nuclear
installations and cover the activities to be carried out in the
event of an emergency. For any new nuclear installation, such
plans shall be prepared and tested before it commences oper-
ation above a low power level agreed by the regulatory body.”
The Convention of Nuclear Safety has 77 contracting parties
with 65 signatories, including the United Kingdom and Euro-
pean Union (under the auspices of EURATOM) (IAEA, 2014a).
In the UK, the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 (HM
Government, 1965), as amended by the Energy Act 2013 (HM
Government, 2013), refers to emergency preparedness within
Section 4.32:
“Conditions that may be attached to a licence by virtue of
subsection (1) may in particular include provision—”
clause (c):
“with respect to preparations for dealing with, and mea-
sures to be taken on the happening of, any accident or other
emergency on the site;”
The Ofﬁce of Nuclear Regulation (ONR) is responsible for
administrating these Acts and the requirements regarding
emergency preparedness are covered in standard Licence Con-
dition 11 (Ofﬁce of Nuclear Regulation, 2013a, p. 11). The ONR
in its guidance document, “Licencing Nuclear Installations”
(Ofﬁce of Nuclear Regulation, 2014), states as part of the sup-
porting evidence required when applying for a Nuclear Site
Licence the applicant should include:
“details of appropriate emergency arrangements and a
suitable emergency plan (this may be limited in extent for
the period before nuclear fuel is brought onto the site);”
The ONR also requires that before the start of active com-
missioning, adequate emergency arrangements should be in
place and exercised as appropriate.
2 Although the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 was amended by
the Energy Act 2013, the sections regarding emergency prepared-
ness  remained unchanged.
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The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (HM Government,
1974) covers protection of employees and the public from work
activities and under it speciﬁc regulations are made that deal
with radiation and nuclear emergencies such as the Radiation
(Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations
2001 (REPPIR 2001) (Health and Safety Executive, 2002). A sep-
arate Act, the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (HM Government,
2004) centres on the roles for responders to all kinds of emer-
gencies.
Article 9 of REPPIR 2001 covers off-site emergency plans,
and Item #1 requires that the local authority should draw
up guidelines to restrict exposure from a reasonably foresee-
able off-site radiation emergency (REPPIR deﬁnes a radiation
emergency as an event which is likely to result in a member
of the public receiving an effective dose in excess of 5 mSv
over the ﬁrst year). It is ONR’s duty to determine whether
the local authority and operator has met  the requirements of
REPPIR. As stated by the Ofﬁce of Nuclear Regulation (2013b):
“REPPIR presents the legal framework for protection of the
public through emergency preparedness for all radiation acci-
dents.” and “REPPIR addresses the need for both on-site and
off-site emergency planning. However, for operators of nuclear
licensed sites the requirement for an on-site emergency plan3
is already covered by the existing nuclear site licence condi-
tions (LC11 and LC9). For operators of nuclear licensed sites,
compliance with the LCs should satisfy equivalent provisions
in REPPIR. For operators of nuclear licensed sites REPPIR man-
dates additional legal requirements for off-site emergency
planning and the provision of information to the public.”
Also, ONR is empowered under Regulations 9(1) and 16(1) to
determine the areas of the Detailed Emergency planning Zone
(DEPZ) and Public Information Zone.
REPPIR is the UK Regulation that puts into force
the EC Basic Safety Standards Directive 96/29/EURATOM
(European Commission, 1996) and Public Information Direc-
tive 89/618/EURATOM (European Commission, 1989). Since the
accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi, these directives have been
repealed and replaced by 2013/59/EURATOM with a deadline
of February 6 2018 for Member States to ensure their legis-
lation is in compliance (European Commission, 2013, p. 59).
The revision of the EC Basic Safety Standards Directive was in
part due to the IAEA’s Basic Safety Standards being revised as
part of changes suggested by the International Commission
for Radiological Protection (ICRP) as detailed in IAEA (2014b)
and also due to events at Fukushima Dai-ichi.
National level emergency planning for civil nuclear instal-
lations is co-ordinated in the United Kingdom by the
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
(BEIS), and is facilitated through various fora. In 2015, the
Department’s predecessor (the Department for Energy and
Climate Change, DECC) published revised guidance, the
“National Nuclear Emergency Planning and Response Guid-
ance” which was compiled with input from those with
3 The authors note here that ONR’s ‘on-site emergency plan’ ter-
minology differs from that contained in REPPIR, which requires an
‘Operator’s Emergency Plan’ (which is the duty of the operator to
prepare), a ‘Carrier’s Emergency Plan’ (which is the duty of the car-
rier to prepare) and an ‘Off-site Emergency Plan’ (which is the duty
of  the local authority to prepare). The Operator’s Plan extends to
legal responsibilities beyond the site boundary, e.g. off-site mon-
itoring and the provision of off-site technical advice. NB ‘Carrier’
refers to an employer undertaking the transport or transfer of any
radioactive substance.
expertise in and responsibilities for nuclear emergency plan-
ning (HM Government, 2015).
2.1.2.  Contents  of  an  emergency  plan
An off-site emergency plan needs to classify the locality sur-
rounding the facility where various actions may or may not
take place. These actions, called ‘countermeasures’, are iden-
tiﬁed and a plan for implementing such measures is developed
in an attempt to minimise the risks arising from exposure
to ionising radiation and risks associated with public anxi-
ety. Countermeasures typically span: evacuation, sheltering,
administering stable iodine, decontamination, and food ban-
ning. Some measures may be implemented over short time
frames (typically in early response when a release is threat-
ened or during the release) and others over long time frames
(typically in the recovery phase). In addition to countermea-
sures, off-site emergency plans also detail the procedures
for establishing command and control, communication ﬂows,
transport and trafﬁc, maintenance of essential infrastructure,
and so forth.
A summary of policies that detail emergency planning
zones over various OECD countries (before the incident at
Fukushima Dai-ichi) can be found in OECD (2003).
Within the UK, the area covered by emergency planning
encompasses the facility and the area where precautionary
and immediate countermeasures might typically need to be
enacted ﬁrst; it also extends beyond this to include com-
munities who might also be affected by the consequences
of an accident (e.g. by longer-term countermeasures or the
indirect effects of a nuclear emergency). For most cases, the
areas where immediate or precautionary countermeasures
are planned in detail extend radially outwards by a few km
(ranging from 1 km for Heysham and Hartlepool to ∼6–7 km
for Sellaﬁeld), as detailed by the Ofﬁce of Nuclear Regulation
(2016). To prevent only part of a settlement being included,
this emergency planning area often forms an irregular shape
such as that for Sizewell. At the (ﬁrst) Hinkley Point C inquiry in
1990, the concept of “extendibility” of the emergency response
was discussed, and an ‘Extended Emergency Planning Zone’
(EEPZ) was derived. The EEPZ could extend up to a 15 km radius
(Health and Safety Executive, 1990). Due to the persistence of
contamination and potential for long-term ingestion, coun-
termeasures restricting food and drinking water may be in
force well beyond the EEPZ and such restrictions may exist for
long times (potentially years). Since the accident at Fukushima
Dai-ichi, the concept of the EEPZ has been superseded by rec-
ommending that ‘extendibility assessments’ are performed on
a site-by-site basis extending incrementally from the site up
to a distance of 30 km (HM Government, 2015). The value of,
and the capability to extend, are inﬂuenced by the characteris-
tics and the local geography surrounding the site. Extendibility
assessments enable the operator and local authorities to work
together to determine what urgent countermeasures and pub-
lic communication strategies would be most effective at each
particular site in the remote event it was necessary to invoke
extendibility.
The plan will also determine what pre-accident informa-
tion is supplied to local residents (in line with REPPIR 2001)
and whether stable iodine4 is pre-distributed or stored for dis-
4 In the UK, potassium iodate is used to protect against radioac-
tive iodine accumulating in the body, particularly the thyroid, by
swamping the body with non-radioactive iodine. These ‘stable
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tribution as necessary. It is noted in Part 2 of the National
Nuclear Emergency Planning and Response Guidance (HM
Government, 2015) that stable iodine may be pre-distributed
in various different ways, namely (1) pre-distribution includ-
ing schools, hospitals, and evacuation reception centres; (2)
distribution on the day by speciﬁed organisations either ‘door-
to-door’, or at the reception centres; and (3) pre-distribution
to collection centres. Further discussion surrounding stable
iodine prophylaxis is provided in Section 2.3.
It should be noted that there is no standard template for
what should be contained within public information, though
REPPIR sets minimum requirements. Signiﬁcant variation in
the amount of information contained within available off-
site emergency plans for the different nuclear power plants
operating in the UK is observed. Detailed off-site emergency
plans are publically available (and online) for Sizewell (Suffolk
Resilience, 2017), Hinkley Point (Somerset County Council,
2008), Dungeness (Kent County Council, 2015), Wylfa (Isle of
Anglesey County Council, 2011), Hunterston (Ayrshire Civil
Contingencies Team, 2015), and Torness (East Lothian Council,
2016)—however, such plans are not publically available for
Heysham and Hartlepool. It is noted that some details on
off-site arrangements are provided in the Emergency Plan
produced by the operator for each nuclear power plant, for
example for Heysham (British Energy Generation Ltd., 2007a)
and Hartlepool (British Energy Generation Ltd., 2007b).
As part of the off-site emergency plan, the location of some
facilities, such as emergency control centres (if not adaptable
from those for other civil contingencies) and reception centres
for evacuees, will need to be identiﬁed. Emergency services,
particularly health services, will need to have the capability to
deal with the monitoring and treatment of contaminated peo-
ple as well as those that have inhaled or ingested radiation.
In addition, the off-site emergency plan outlines the require-
ments for speciﬁc equipment, such as protective clothing and
radiation monitoring devices.
Off-site emergency plans should indicate what counter-
measures will be adopted. The general principle of such
countermeasures in the UK differs from that suggested by the
IAEA and the wider global community. In the UK, the coun-
termeasures are called “Emergency Reference Levels” (ERLs)
(Morrey, 1997), based on the dose avoided if the action is taken
(this does not mean that no dose has been received, only
that which is avoided by the action) as shown in Table 1. The
ERLs have both a lower and upper limit which are based on
the beneﬁts and disbeneﬁts that are provided to the affected
population. Action is not recommended below the lower ERL
because the conventional risks and social disruption resulting
from the countermeasure are likely to outweigh the beneﬁts,
whereas action is always recommended if the upper ERL is
exceeded. The most recent IAEA guidance on nuclear emer-
gency planning (IAEA, 2015) centres on the use of Operational
Intervention Levels (OILs) which are prescriptive limits based
on dose rates which may evolve over the period of the accident,
as outlined in Table 2. Furthermore, ICRP uses the concept of
reference levels for existing and emergency exposure situa-
iodine’ prophylactics are only needed as a countermeasure for
accidents at nuclear power plants as it protects mainly against 131I
which decays quite rapidly with a half-life of about 8 days and is
otherwise not present in harmful quantities at other nuclear facil-
ities. It is noted that other countries use potassium iodide instead
of  potassium iodate.
Table 1 – UK Emergency Reference Levels (ERLs) that
provide guidance for when speciﬁc countermeasures
should be adopted (Morrey, 1997).
Countermeasure Body organ Dose equivalent levela (mSv)
Lower Upper
Sheltering Whole bodyb 3 30
Thyroid, lung, skinc 30 300
Evacuation Whole bodyb 30 300
Thyroid, lung, skinc 300 3000
Administration
of stable iodine
Thyroid 30 300
a These values should be interpreted as approximate ﬁgures.
b The numerical values for whole body ERLs may also be used for
comparison with the quantities of effective dose and effective
dose equivalent.
c These single organ ERLs were speciﬁed prior to the deﬁnition of
effective dose by the ICRP. With exception to stable iodine ERLs,
their use now would not normally be expected.
tions (ICRP, 2009a). Reference levels for emergency exposure
situations should be set in the band of 20–100 mSv  effec-
tive dose (acute or per year). The reference level represents
the level of residual dose, or risk, above which it is gener-
ally judged to be inappropriate to plan to allow exposures
to occur. ICRP considers that a dose rising towards 100 mSv
will almost always justify protective measures; and that pro-
tection against all exposures, above or below the reference
level, should be optimised. Euratom’s Basic Safety Standards
Directive also details the use of reference levels (European
Commission, 2013).
In the case of countermeasures for foods, the UK uses Com-
munity Food Intervention Levels (CFILs) set by the EU under
Council Regulation (Euratom) 2016/52 (European Commission,
2016). The values used throughout Europe differ from the
intervention levels adopted in the United States and the lev-
els that were in place shortly after the accident in Fukushima
Dai-ichi. Table 3 summarises the differences between these
intervention levels for foodstuffs. Food intervention levels are
based on various assumptions on the food intake of repre-
sentative persons: these may vary for different foodstuffs and
whether they are only locally consumed or distributed more
widely, including to other countries. Due to the requirement to
ensure ingestion doses are limited to all potential consumers,
the assumptions used in deriving the intervention levels are
often very conservative (Waddington et al., 2017b).
From a UK perspective, the UK ERLs are presently being
reviewed, though it is expected that any changes to this guid-
ance will be minimal. Another open discussion surrounds the
use of OILs compared to ERLs. Whilst OILs, due to their pre-
scriptive nature, have the advantage of being straight-forward
to implement, OILs rely heavily on assumptions and require
a large number of accurate dose measurements. Also as OILs
comprise single values, the corresponding cut-offs between
an intervention taking place can be suboptimal (as detailed
in Section 2.3). There may be advantages to using both ERLs
and OILs in future emergency management plans, with ERLs
being used in the early phase where accurate dose measure-
ments may be limited and OILs (or equivalent) being used in
the late-phase when such information may become available.
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Table 2 – Dose rate limits as suggested by the IAEA (2013) and Operational Intervention Levels (OILs) contained in IAEA
(2015). OILs are intended as prescriptive limits, as opposed to the indicative ERLs in Table 1.
Time after release Dose rate limit Intervention Effective dose to
representative
person
<1 day (OIL1) ≥1000 Sv/h OIL1: immediate safe
evacuation (plus associated
countermeasures)
100  mSv over 7 day
exposure period
<10 days (OIL2) ≥100 Sv/h OIL2:  preparation for relocation
(plus associated countermeasures)
to be done within a week to a
month thereafter
100  mSv over 1 year
exposure period
>10 days – 1 month (OIL2) ≥25 Sv/h
<7 days (OIL3) ≥1 Sv/h OIL3: stop distribution and
consumption of
non-essential food and
water that is potentially at
risk. Assess thereafter
using OIL7
10  mSv over 1 year of
consumption
>2 days (OIL7) 1000 Bq/kg 131I or 200 Bq/kg 137Cs OIL7: stop consumption if
non-essential. Replace
essential foods or relocate
public if replacements are
not available
10  mSv over 1 year of
consumption
Table 3 – Countermeasure intervention levels for foodstuffs around the world. EU values are provided by the CFILs, as
outlined in European Commission (2016). US Derived Intervention Levels are provided from U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (2005). Intervention levels for Japan during the response phase “Japan (a)” and recovery phase “Japan
(b)” of the accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi, obtained from Food Safety Commission of Japan (2011), and Ministry of
Health, Labour and Welfare (2012).
Location Infant uptake (Bq/kg) Milk (Bq/kg) Foodstuff, excl. liquid (Bq/kg) Liquid foodstuff (Bq/kg)
131I Japan (a,b) 100 300 2000 300
EUc 150 500 2000 500
USAd 170
134,137Cs Japan (a)a 200 200 500 200
Japan (b)b 50 50 100 10
EUc 400 1000 1250 1000
USAd 1200
90Sr EUc 75 125 750 125
USAd 160
239Pu EUc 1 20 80 20
USAd 2
a These values include take into account the contribution of radioactive strontium.
b These values include take into account the contribution of other radioisotopes (except iodine), e.g. radioactive strontium, plutonium, etc.
c EU legislation uses different terminology to that in the table. 131I corresponds to the ‘sum of isotopes of iodine, notably 131I’; 90Sr corresponds
to the ‘sum of isotopes of strontium, notably 90Sr’; 239Pu corresponds to the ‘sum of all -emitting isotopes of plutonium and transplutonium
elements, notably 239Pu and 241Am, and 134,137Cs corresponds to the ‘sum of all other nuclides of half-life greater than 10 days, notably 134Cs
and 137Cs.
d 239Pu corresponds to 238,239Pu and 241Am. In addition, separate consideration is given to 103Ru and 106Ru based off summed individual
concentration levels.
2.2.  Response  phase
The response to any event on a nuclear facility site depends
on its magnitude and potential to cause harm. In particu-
lar, events that involve, or have the potential to involve, a
signiﬁcant release of radioactivity off-site mean that coun-
termeasures involving the public may need to be invoked.
Depending on the event, there may be a sufﬁcient delay
between the initial incident and a release such that actions
can be taken before the release occurs: in some cases coun-
termeasures may be unnecessary as the event is terminated
by on-site actions without an off-site release occurring. The
response phase can therefore be considered to comprise two
sub-phases: pre-release and post-release actions.
2.2.1.  Pre-release
The pre-release stage is that part of the response phase
before an actual release has occurred and when an initiat-
ing event has the potential to lead to a signiﬁcant probability
of a radioactive release. As soon as the operator considers
that there is the potential for an off-site release it would
trigger the site’s full nuclear emergency arrangements. This
would include notifying off-site bodies as well as implement-
ing measures aimed at restoring the facility to a safe state and
preventing (or at least mitigating) any releases from the site.
The period of time between the initial alarm being raised
and a subsequent release can vary signiﬁcantly for different
technologies and designs of nuclear power plants and differ-
ent accident sequences. For example, from the Level-2 PSA of
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the European Pressurised Reactor (EPR), the containment is
predicted to stay intact for at least twenty-four hours, but in a
small number of cases the release phase is predicted to start
in less than two hours after the initiating event (AREVA and
EDF Energy, 2012). It should be noted that short release times
do not necessarily correspond to larger magnitudes of release.
Part of the provisions within the Operator’s emergency plan
is to determine at what stage the off-site plan is initiated by
declaring a radiation emergency. The off-site plan in the UK
is effectively run by the local police emergency organisation,
headed by a senior police commander who is advised by rep-
resentatives of many  agencies. The effective management of
a radiation emergency will require access to specialist scien-
tiﬁc and technical advice. Prior to 2015, this was offered by
a Government Technical Advisor, who was a senior member
of ONR on temporary attachment to DECC to provide indepen-
dent advice. Since 2013, at the local level, local responders will
be advised by the site operators and a Science and Technical
Advice Cell (STAC), who  would provide independent science
and technical advice using all available resources, including
ONR, Environment Agency, Food Standards Agency, etc. At
the national level, Lead Government Departments (LGD) are
responsible for ensuring they have effective arrangements in
place to access technical and scientiﬁc advice in a timely man-
ner during an emergency situation. The establishment of a
Science Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) would nor-
mally provide such advice. The roles of STAC, SAGE and the
response structure are detailed further in the ‘Concept of Oper-
ations’ section of the National Nuclear Emergency Planning
and Response Guidance (HM Government, 2015).
Precautionary countermeasures, such as sheltering or
evacuation may be instigated to mitigate the probability of a
dose being received. These countermeasures would be initi-
ated by alerts from the local radio/TV when the emergency
siren has been sounded and people follow the guidance in the
pre-distributed information.
In general, decisions on precautionary measures prior to a
release are taken on the basis of judgement of the potential for
the incident to escalate, allied to wind speed and direction and
predictions of changes to meteorological conditions. If there
is sufﬁcient information on the likely source term, and time
is available, predictions of the prospective releases emanating
from the facility, calculated using speciﬁc emergency manage-
ment software (such as RODOS Ehrhardt and Weis, 2000), can
assist in deciding whether precautionary countermeasures
should be adopted. Such modelling may be performed even
with relatively sparse data.
No precautionary measures were undertaken during the
accidents that took place at Three Mile Island 2 (TMI-2) (Moss
and Sills, 1981) and Chernobyl (Medvedev, 1990). In both cases
this was because of the nature of the event. At TMI-2 it only
became apparent there was a problem well after the acci-
dent had progressed and fuel melt and hydrogen release to
the containment had occurred, but the containment building
meant that there was virtually no release of activity to the
environment. At Chernobyl, the event was very rapid due to
safety systems being overridden and the reactor being placed
in an unstable condition; the explosion occurred within one
minute of the low-power experiment taking place. Hence,
there was no time to take precautionary measures close to the
site (Smith and Beresford, 2005). Even if there had been time
for such measures, the local population had received no prior
information of the hazards of radiation nor what would hap-
pen in the instance of an accident (International Chernobyl
Project and IAEA, 1991).
The off-site emergency countermeasures at Fukushima
Dai-ichi on 11 March 2011 are set out brieﬂy in Table 4.
The initial seismic event took out off-site power, but the on-
site systems worked satisfactorily. However the associated
tsunami, which hit the site about 45 min  later ﬂooded the
emergency power systems so all on-site power was lost. Note
that fuel damage in Unit #1 started ∼4 h after the tsunami
struck (roughly when a nuclear emergency was declared) and
the reactor pressure vessel was damaged after ∼11 h.
Fukushima Dai-ni, a nearby nuclear power station located
∼16 km from Fukushima Dai-ichi lost off-site power due to
the earthquake but not its on-site emergency back-up diesel
generators. Residents within 3 km were ordered to evacuate
whilst those within 10 km were ordered to shelter.
Whilst precautionary measures for nuclear-related inci-
dents may be able to limit the radiological risk, there is the
potential for such actions to induce wide-scale panic. For
example, as detailed in Section 2.3, at TMI, although it was
only suggested pregnant women and children may wish to
leave the area, many  residents did self-evacuate. The resul-
tant risks from such panic may well be signiﬁcantly greater
than the radiological risks.
2.3.  Post-release
At the point when an environmental release occurs, the emer-
gency plans aim to manage the consequences of such a
release, including wider consequences such as the health
of the public, by implementing effective immediate counter-
measures. The actual countermeasures implemented are very
much dependent on the amount and isotopic composition of
the radioactive material released from the facility. It is also
dependent on the different parts of society that are affected
by the release.
For those located relatively close to the site covered by the
detailed plans for precautionary and immediate countermea-
sures and who may prospectively be susceptible to the largest
off-site radiation doses, the administration of stable iodine in
the aftermath of the release is one of the key interventions
that can be performed to limit the intake of the short-lived
radioisotope 131I (as noted earlier the use of iodine prophy-
laxis would only be potentially appropriate in the vicinity of
the release). The rationale behind stable iodine prophylaxis is
detailed further by the World Health Organization (1999). As
mentioned in Section 2, various methods may be employed to
pre-distribute stable iodine. As an aside, there is similar vari-
ation in the ways of pre-distribution of stable iodine in the
United States within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone
surrounding the nuclear power plant, but it is noted that there
is a wide range of efﬁcacies of such schemes ranging from
3.5% to 70% (National Research Council, 2004). From a UK  per-
spective, one particular study on the efﬁcacy of stable iodine
distribution surrounding the site in Barrow-in-Furness sug-
gested that the scheme employed there was 60% effective after
two years of adoption (Astbury et al., 1999). Further discussion
surrounding the issues of iodine distribution and adminis-
tration following a nuclear accident is provided in Johnson,
(2003). Further details on iodine distribution across Europe
are presented in European Commission Directorate-General
for Energy et al. (2010).
Sheltering and iodine prophylaxis may sufﬁce for small
releases but if the dose is projected to exceed the ERLs for
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Table 4 – Brief timeline for countermeasures at Fukushima Dai-ichi. Data taken from Government of Japan (2011).
Friday 11 March
14.46: Earthquake occurred: off-site electrical power lost
15.27: TEPCO (the utility) reported the site struck by three tsunami waves, on-site emergency diesel back-up generators affected and became
inoperative
15.42: TEPCO ﬁrst emergency report to government
19.03: Nuclear emergency declared
20:50: Evacuation within 2 km of plant by Fukushima Prefecture
21:23: Prime Minister extended evacuation to 3 km and sheltering for 3–10 km
Saturday 12 March
05:44: Evacuation extended to 10 km
18:25: Evacuation extended to 20 km
Tuesday 15 March
11.01: Government ordered sheltering 20–30 km
evacuation (or distribution of iodate tablets outside the pre-
distribution area for a nuclear power plant is difﬁcult) then
evacuation may be necessary. Evacuation needs to be carried
out in an ordered manner and will be subject to the nature of
the demographics, e.g. schools, hospitals, and domestic prop-
erty. Whilst schools and hospitals may possibly be evacuated
in a single process, domestic property may be scattered and
so evacuation may be more  difﬁcult. The age of the potential
evacuees is also a factor as young children have a higher radi-
ological risk and therefore may need to be evacuated at an
early stage, along with their families if possible. Evacuating
those who  are inﬁrm or elderly may lead to a greater harm
due to stress and/or medical complications.
Typically, evacuation may include decisions based not on
the intervention levels themselves, but on a precautionary
basis from predictions of the course of the accident. Political
and public pressure may not signiﬁcantly factor in the imme-
diate aftermath of the release. However, as the response phase
evolves, such pressure may affect the emergency plan. We
posit that the emergency plan must be adaptive to account for
the evolution of the release but be robust enough to withstand
political and public pressure.
In the immediate aftermath of a major release, counter-
measures (particularly food bans) may be needed up to 40 km
from the facility (Health and Safety Executive, 1994), though as
time progresses after an accident, this distance may increase.
Note that the affected zone would tend to be wedge-shaped
rather than circular, though this may change as the weather
conditions change (e.g. as depicted in Figs. 1 and 2 for the
accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi).
It is worth considering the emergency response at the three
most well-known nuclear power plant accidents.
The following information about the response to the acci-
dent at TMI-2 is taken from Moss and Sills (1981). Evacuation
at TMI-2 was not initially recommended by the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. An advisory note suggested preg-
nant women and preschool children within 5 miles of the
station might wish to evacuate. However, two days after the
initial accident, (i.e. when initial difﬁculties were seen at the
plant) a signiﬁcant amount of individually-driven, voluntary
self-evacuation was observed that was prompted by the poten-
tial release of material from the reactor’s containment. From
NRC estimates, voluntary self-evacuation comprised: ∼21,000
people (60%) living within 5 miles of the plant; ∼56,000 peo-
ple (44%) living within a 5–10 mile annulus of the plant; and
∼67,000 people (32%) living within a 10–15 mile annulus of the
plant. Most of these people left two days after the accident and
the median time period before returning was seven days after
the accident.
The lead-up and the response to the accident at Chernobyl
is well documented (International Chernobyl Project and IAEA,
1991; Smith and Beresford, 2005), and is brieﬂy summarised
here. The steam explosion at 01:24 on 26 April 1986 destroyed
part of the graphite core and the roof of Reactor #4. This led to
ﬁres throughout the turbine hall and also inside the building.
Two on-site workers were killed by the explosion. Fireﬁght-
ers from Pripyat, the nearest town to Chernobyl located ∼3 km
from the site, arrived at the site within minutes and within half
an hour were joined by other ﬁreﬁghters. It is noted that these
ﬁreﬁghters did not have specialist training for events involv-
ing radioactive materials. The radiation levels in some of the
accessible places to ﬁght the ﬁres exceeded 100 Gy/h5 and due
to the lack of radiation monitoring, personal dosimetry, and
awareness, no measures were taken to limit the exposure and
doses to the emergency personnel. 132 emergency workers
were affected by Acute Radiation Sickness in the ﬁrst twelve
hours following the accident and were initially hospitalized in
Pripyat. Small squads of emergency personnel on site provided
ﬁrst aid, evacuated those who needed further medical assis-
tance, and distributed potassium iodide tablets. After twelve
hours, a specialised emergency team arrived and within 36 h
examined more  than 350 persons on-site. In the ﬁrst three
days of the accident, 299 people suspected of acute radiation
sickness were sent to specialised treatment centres and hos-
pitals; thereafter approximately 200 people were admitted to
these centres and hospitals for monitoring of acute radiation
sickness. By 10 May 1986, the ﬁre at Reactor #4 was extin-
guished and efforts were in place to stabilise the site (as brieﬂy
described in the Recovery section). In the months that fol-
lowed, a total of 28 workers died from acute radiation sickness,
as reported in Table 1 of the International Chernobyl Project
and IAEA (1991).
From an off-site perspective, no ofﬁcial information had
been given to those living in Pripyat on the day of the acci-
dent. Around 44,000 people were evacuated ∼36 h after the
accident to Polesskoe. Once they arrived in Polesskoe, it took
a further three days for doctors to perform blood tests and to
refer those showing acute radiation sickness to nearby hospi-
tals. The evacuation zone was expanded to a radial distance
of 10 km on 1 May 1986 and the decision to evacuate radially
out to 30 km on 2 May 1986 and took four days to complete. In
total, ∼116,000 people and 60,000 cattle were evacuated from
5 For further details on the deﬁnition Grays (Gy), Sieverts (Sv),
and Becquerels (Bq), the readers is referred to the glossary of
(ICRP, 2007) and (Till and Grogan, 2008): basically Gys are a
measure of deposited energy, Svs are the dose that results and
Bqs are a measure of the number of radioactive disintegrations.
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Fig. 1 – Simulated 131I release following the accidents at Units #1 and #3 at Fukushima Dai-ichi. Figures taken from
UNSCEAR (2014).
Fig. 2 – Simulated 131I release following the accident at Units #2 at Fukushima Dai-ichi. Figures taken from UNSCEAR (2014).
an area of 3500 km2 although a number either refused to leave
or returned surreptitiously. From 10 May 1986, absorbed dose
rate contours were produced that deﬁned three separate areas:
prohibited zones (200 Gy/h totalling 1100 km2); the initial
evacuation zone (50 Gy/h totalling 3000 km2); and a strict-
controlled area (30 Gy/h totalling 8000 km2). Further areas
where the dose rate exceeded 50 Gy/h were evacuated after
10 May 1986. Since the accident at Chernobyl, ∼350,000 people
have been evacuated from the areas surrounding the plant.
According to the IAEA (2005) report, no deaths in the public
have been directly attributed to the accident though ofﬁcial
estimates are that ∼4000 deaths are likely to result from the
doses received. Since that report was released UNSCEAR (2008)
concluded that the contamination of milk with 131I, for which
prompt countermeasures were lacking, resulted in large doses
to the thyroids of members of the general public; this led to
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Fig. 3 – Rate of all radionuclides released into the
atmosphere from the accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi. Blue
denotes unit #1, red denotes unit #2, and green denotes
unit #3. Figure taken from IRSN (2012).
a substantial fraction of the more  than 6000 thyroid cancers
observed to date among people who  were children or adoles-
cents at the time of the accident (by 2005, 15 cases had proved
fatal). Furthermore, current radiation-induced thyroid cancer
risk models predict that the excess risk continues into later
life as a proportion of the background risk of thyroid cancer,
which increases with attained age (Wakeford, 2016).
Aspects of the response phase from the accident at
Fukushima Dai-ichi are contained in the “Report of the
Japanese Government to the IAEA Ministerial Conference on
Nuclear Safety” (Government of Japan, 2011) and are presented
below. Upon the release caused by the hydrogen explosion
at Unit #1 of Fukushima Dai-ichi, the evacuation zone was
extended to a radius of 20 km from the nuclear power plant
(at 18:25; March 12) — this was partly driven by the antici-
pation of the potential for further incidents to occur at the
other Units. This order was given at 18:25 on March 12. At 17:39
on March 12, the evacuation zone for Fukushima Dai-ni was
also extended to 10 km.  The evacuation involved 78,200 peo-
ple from both of these areas. On March 15 at 11:00, ∼62,400
residents within the 20–30 km annulus of Fukushima Dai-ichi
were ordered to ‘stay-in-house’. However, this order went well
beyond the typical times associated with sheltering. It was
observed that within the extended ‘stay-in-house’ zone that
voluntary self-evacuation was evident especially as time pro-
gressed and that the standard of living for those within that
area signiﬁcantly decreased as time progressed. On March
25, the zone was reclassiﬁed and voluntary self-evacuation
was supported. Given the damage caused by the earthquake
and tsunami, roads and other infrastructures that would have
assisted the emergency management plan were severely dam-
aged which hampered the evacuation.
An observation from the incident at Fukushima Dai-ichi
is that what may be an optimal response for one particular
release (i.e. sheltering, which is typically limited to a max-
imum of two days), may become sub-optimal if there are
subsequent releases (i.e. people sheltering for too long, or
evacuating through the plume of the second release) (Gering
et al., 2013). This is highlighted (as shown in Fig. 3) by
the release pattern from Fukushima Dai-ichi, with the main
releases from Units #2 and #3 occurring two days after the
release at Unit #1. For the last set of evacuees within the
20 km radius additional stable iodine needed to be adminis-
tered as they evacuated through the plume. In total, 164,218
people evacuated, including those who voluntarily evacuated
(Yasumura, 2014).
UNSCEAR have reported that “No radiation-related deaths
or acute diseases have been observed among the workers and
general public exposed to radiation from the accident.” and
“The doses to the general public, both those incurred during
the ﬁrst year and estimated for their lifetimes, are gener-
ally low or very low. No discernible increased incidence of
radiation-related health effects are expected among exposed
members of the public or their descendants. The most impor-
tant health effect is on mental and social well-being, related to
the enormous impact of the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear
accident, and the fear and stigma related to the perceived
risk of exposure to ionizing radiation” (United Nations, 2013).
The UN also note that an estimated 160 workers received
doses in excess of 100 mSv,  but the associated increased inci-
dence of cancer is expected to be indiscernible in this cohort
(United Nations, 2013). Yasumura (2014) points out that whilst
there have been no prompt radiation-induced deaths, prompt
deaths arising from the evacuation were observed, especially
with the elderly and inﬁrm. We  posit that radiation-induced
deaths and deaths arising from implementing the evacuation
policies should both be considered as part of the nuclear acci-
dent. By doing this, it can hopefully lead to more  effective
emergency management procedures.
One way in which evacuation related deaths can be gauged
is by looking at the total distances that evacuees travel in
(person-km or vehicle-km) and to compare this against associ-
ated deaths per person-km and/or vehicle-km associated with
car travel. A compilation of fatalities per vehicle-km can be
found in World Health Organization (2013). An initial study of
non-radiological evacuation risks was performed by Aumonier
and Morrey (1990) and suggested that within the UK an upper
risk estimate of 1 × 10−8 per person-km should be assigned for
both fatality and injury, although it is noted in that work that
such risks are likely to be lower during an evacuation; and the
risk from preparing to evacuate were difﬁcult to assess, but
presumably would be higher than the domestic daily accident
rate of 3.3 × 10−7 per person for fatalities. It also noted that
stress from the evacuation is inseparable from the stress of
the accident itself; and that self-evacuation poses an issue in
assessing the overall collective risk associated with evacua-
tion.
2.4.  Recovery  phase
The recovery phase begins once the event is brought under
control. Following certain immediate countermeasures, such
as short-term evacuation, decisions on whether the affected
population should be relocated or the timescale on which they
can return need to be made based on the monitoring of radia-
tion contamination. Before returning to their homes it may be
necessary that the land is remediated so that the occupants
will not incur unacceptable levels of dose. This will require
one of various techniques to be employed and some form of
disposal of materials affected. Food bans can be expected to
continue for a signiﬁcant period following the accident.
It is seldom that the affected region can be expected to
return to its previous state entirely. Perhaps the site, the region
or environment is damaged beyond repair. Even when the
system can be physically rebuilt as it was previously, those
involved, their communities and the operator, will have the
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memory  of the incident with them for a long time. Managing
realistic expectations of what will happen during the recovery
phase is far more  important than often thought. The stress
impacts of the Chernobyl accident arose partly through poor
information and expectation management.
In the United Kingdom, management options for both the
pre-release phase and long-term recovery phases are out-
lined in the UK Recovery Handbook for Radiation Incidents
(Health Protection Agency, 2009). The handbook was devel-
oped by the Health Protection Agency (now Public Health
England), in consultation with various stakeholders includ-
ing the government, public service agencies, regulatory bodies
and professional bodies. The purpose of the handbook is
to offer guidance in non-crisis times to national and local
authorities, emergency services, radiation protection experts,
agriculture and food production sectors, the water industry
and others who  may be affected by a radiological instance
in developing their recovery strategies. A useful extension of
the handbook may involve coupling it to a Geographical Infor-
mation Systems database to allow an immediate comparison
between different management strategies throughout the UK.
Further information on the underpinning science, the range
and complexity of the issues responders will face, and point-
ers to delivering a recovery strategy are provided in Part 3 of the
National Nuclear Emergency Planning and Response Guidance
(HM Government, 2015).
At the time of the accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi, inter-
national guidance on the protection of people in emergency
exposure situations and for those living in long-term contam-
inated areas was provided by ICRP 109 (ICRP, 2009a, p. 109)
and ICRP 111 (ICRP, 2009b, p. 111; ICRP, 2009c) respectively.
This guidance uses the concept of reference levels for existing
and emergency exposure situations, with recommended ref-
erence levels for emergency exposure situations in the band
of 20–100 mSv  effective dose (acute or per year). The reference
level represents the level of residual dose or risk above which
it is generally judged to be inappropriate to plan to allow expo-
sures to occur. ICRP considers that a dose rising towards 100
mSv  will almost always justify protective measures; and that
protection against all exposures, above or below the reference
level, should be optimised. [For comparison and contrast, in
ICRP 103 (ICRP, 2007), reference levels for existing exposure sit-
uations are recommended to be within 1–20 mSv  of projected
dose per year. Euratom’s Basic Safety Standards Directive also
details the use of reference levels (European Commission,
2013)]. The accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi has led to unfore-
seen issues and concerns with this guidance; notably, the
guidance had not covered the necessary remediation level
explicitly, so it implicitly assumed that it should be performed
down to the baseline level of 1 mSv  per year over background,
which is the dose limit to the public from normal operations.
Whilst remediation to a low threshold may be sensible from
a cost-beneﬁt perspective in densely populated urban areas,
it is not necessarily sensible from a cost-beneﬁt perspective
in areas where there are lower levels of permanent occupa-
tion. Another factor that requires further consideration in this
guidance is the time required to remediate the contaminated
area. It can be argued that in the majority of cases, evacua-
tion followed by swift remediation and repopulation is more
beneﬁcial to those affected than protracted evacuation and
relocation (Yumashev et al., 2017). Present guidance suggests
that relocation is allowed if doses in contaminated areas do
not exceed 20 mSv  per year on the basis that further reme-
diation will take place. However, the available workforce to
perform the remediation can be signiﬁcantly diminished by
the scale of the work needed and hence this may inhibit the
ability for those people who are relocated to return.
In short, there are still unanswered questions that sur-
round the transition from the response phase to the recovery
phase, and whether there can be a transition from recovery to
normality.
A detailed timeline of the events of both the on-site and
off-site recovery of TMI-2 is presented in IAEA and JRC (2012)
and is detailed in the USNRC “Programmatic Environmen-
tal Impact Statement” NUREG-0683 (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, 1981). As mentioned earlier, following the very
limited release of radioactivity at TMI-2, the majority of those
who self-evacuated returned within two weeks and there were
no detectable health effects on plant workers or the public.
Estimates suggest that ∼52% of people living within 20 miles
self-evacuated (including ∼72% of mothers who  had preschool
children) (Dohrenwend, 1983). For those who were living in the
affected areas at the time of the accident, a sharp rise in non-
speciﬁc distress, “demoralization”, was observed in April 1979
which appeared to sharply reduce toward background levels
in follow-up measurements made in May 1979 and mid-July
1979; this contrasts with public distrust which remained high
during this period (Dohrenwend, 1983).
A signiﬁcant amount of research has been performed
and published on the recovery phase of Chernobyl and is
encompassed in research presented in this special issue. Fur-
ther information can be found in IAEA (2002b), IAEA (2002b),
IAEA (1996), International Chernobyl Project and IAEA (1991),
Medvedev (1990), and Smith and Beresford (2005).
Details of the continuing off-site recovery at Fukushima
Dai-ichi are best described in Chapter 36 of 2014 World Bank
publication “Megadisasters” (Ranghieri and Ishiwatari, 2014).
Following the incident ∼160,000 left their hometowns for tran-
sition shelters. As of mid-2012, ∼62,000 of those within the
evacuation zone had evacuated away from the Fukushima pre-
fecture, with this number decreasing to ∼48,000 by mid-2014.
The location of these people across Japan is shown in Fig. 4. It
is noted that the displacement of people from the Fukushima
prefecture has placed strains on housing and other civic ser-
vices within other prefectures hosting those evacuated and
that in certain places tensions exist between the hosts and
evacuees.
3194 premature deaths have been ascribed to “physical
and mental fatigue” from the Earthquake (Table 5). As of
September 30 2014, 1793 deaths have been recorded from
those within the Fukushima prefecture which have been
ascribed to physical and mental fatigue from the accident at
Fukushima Dai-ichi (The Reconstruction Agency, 2014).
Preliminary investigations into the psychological distress
caused by those evacuated due to the Great East Japan Earth-
quake and accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi have recently been
published (Yabe et al., 2014) and show protracted mental
health trauma up to the end of the 2012 Japanese ﬁnancial
year. The percentage of those who were surveyed from the
evacuation zones with serious mental illnesses are between
4–5 times higher than background (∼12–15% cf. 3%). It would
be of interest to see how these numbers, and those reported
in Table 5, are related to other measures of morbidity (such
as Quality Affected Life Years). Nearly four years on from the
accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi the majority of the evacuated
areas are still yet to be repopulated, as shown in Fig. 5. Even
once an area has been rehabilitated, only a fraction of those
people may return due to the lack of public services. This
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Fig. 4 – The number of evacuees from the Fukushima prefecture, as of February 13th 2014. Figure adapted from Fukushima
on the Globe (2014).
Table 5 – The number of earthquake-related deaths in the Great East Japan Earthquake (by both prefecture and time) up
to September 30 2014. Data taken from The Reconstruction Agency (2014).
Prefecture Number of attributable deaths in the time period since the Great East Japan Earthquake Prefecture total
<1 week 1 week–1
month
1–3
months
3–6
months
6–12
months
–18
months
18–24
months
24–30
months
30–36
months
36–42
months
Iwate 93 120 116 59 36 14 5 1 2 0 446
Miyagi 232 332 212 77 28 8 5 3 2 1 900
Yamagata 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
Fukushima 111 256 333 315 349 189 129 82 29 0 1793
Ibaraki 19 12 5 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 41
Saitama 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Chiba 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Tokyo Met. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Kanagawa 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Nagano 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Total 462 724 667 456 414 212 139 86 33 1 3194
Cumulative total 462 1186 1853 2309 2723 2955 3074 3160 3193 3194 3194
has been observed with the lifting of evacuation orders for
Hirono Town, where only ∼25% of the town’s inhabitants have
returned within 15 months of the evacuation orders being
lifted (Ranghieri and Ishiwatari, 2014). It is noted that this
effect has also been observed following the evacuation of New
Orleans due to Hurricane Katrina in August 2005. The popula-
tion of New Orleans 11 months after the hurricane was only
∼47% compared to what was recorded in the 2000 US Census;
which by July 2014 had risen to ∼79% (Plyer, 2015).
Experience from the world’s previous major nuclear acci-
dents provides us with two important lessons:
(a) well-meaning countermeasures introduced purely on the
basis of radiological protection “rules” can do harm as well
as good; and
(b) more  generally, that the non-radiological health conse-
quences of a nuclear accident may well be more  signiﬁcant
than those caused directly by exposure to radiation (World
Health Organization, 2005a,b, 2006; Waddington et al.,
2017a).
Given these important and now well-documented ﬁndings,
there is a need to guard against the danger that future inter-
national guidance on nuclear emergency planning will not be
driven by radiation dose-related criteria to the exclusion of
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Fig. 5 – Areas where evacuation orders have been issued following the accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi. Figure adapted from
Ministry for Economy, Trade and Industry (2014).
social and economic needs. It is sensible to bear in mind at all
times the principles of radiological protection, as codiﬁed by
the ICRP (2007), which require that
• “any decision that alters the radiation exposure situation
should do more  good than harm” (the “principle of justiﬁ-
cation”); and
• “the likelihood of incurring exposure, the number of peo-
ple exposed, and the magnitude of their individual doses
should all be kept as low as reasonably achievable, taking
into account economic and societal factors” (the “principle
of optimization”).
3.  Economic  costs  within  the  phases  of  an
accident
A balance needs to be struck between the costs of implement-
ing safety measures to reduce the frequency and/or mitigate
the consequences of an accident and the costs of the accident
should it occur. This requires a consideration of what the costs
of an accident would be. In general, the costs of developing
and exercising an emergency plan, and the implementation
costs if an accident occurs, are not speciﬁcally considered.
The following paragraphs provide a brief synopsis of typical
economic consequences associated with nuclear accidents. In
the UK, the computer model COCO-2 has been developed to
assess these economic consequences as outlined in Higgins
et al. (2008).
3.1.  Factors  affecting  the  economic  costs  of  a  nuclear
accident
Details on the basis of economic costs are taken from an
overview into the economic implications of a nuclear accident
that can be found in the Organisation for Economic Devel-
opment’s report “Methodologies for Assessing the Economic
Consequences of Nuclear Reactor Accidents” (OECD-NEA,
2000).
From an economic perspective, the cost of a nuclear acci-
dent can be viewed as the cost of restoring those affected by
such an accident to their pre-accident state, as far as possible.
Some of these costs are tangible, in that these are quantiﬁable
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costs that relate to an identiﬁable asset or source, but there
are also intangible losses such as the stress suffered by people
who  have had their lives disrupted. Costing intangible losses
of this kind is extremely difﬁcult a priori. These issues are
discussed in Higgins et al. (2008).
Tangible losses can involve both direct and indirect costs.
Direct costs are those that are directly attributable to the acci-
dent. Indirect costs can be deﬁned as those that are secondary
effects from the accident. Direct costs are typically easier to
quantify than indirect costs. It is also noted that certain ben-
eﬁts may be observed by placing certain countermeasures or
actions in place6 and these have to also be factored in to the
economic costing.
Due to the immediate and potentially protracted effects
from a radiological release, both “short-term” and “long term”
costs need to be accounted for, ranging from the costs of
prompt countermeasures to the costs associated with latent
and hereditary health effects. Countermeasures thus have the
important role in cost-effectively counterbalancing detrimen-
tal health and social effects.
The costs associated with countermeasures span popu-
lation movement, agricultural countermeasures and restric-
tions, and decontamination. Population movement  covers
evacuation (transportation, temporary accommodation, and
food); managing the evacuation, the evacuees, and the evac-
uated area; loss of income, capital value and investment on
land and property; and the health effects from the worry
and upheaval of the accident. Costs associated with agricul-
tural countermeasures and restrictions include: the loss of
food (including the replacement cost of alternative supplies);
the loss of capital value of land and stock during the period
of restriction7; and storage/processing/disposal costs. Decon-
tamination costs include: providing the necessary labour (and
accounting for adverse health effects), equipment and mate-
rials, as well as transporting and disposing of the generated
waste. Microeconomic approaches can be used to ascertain
these costs if the accident only affects a single country (e.g. the
accident at TMI-2), whereas macroeconomic approaches may
also need to be used if an accident has ramiﬁcations beyond
the directly affected country (e.g. in the instance of Chernobyl).
The costs associated with radiation-induced health effects
span: early effects, such as acute radiation sickness, see e.g.
UNSCEAR (1962); latent effects, such as radiation-induced can-
cers, detailed further in National Research Council (2006) and
UNSCEAR (2008); and hereditary effects (UNSCEAR, 2001). In
addition, non-radiological health effects must be accounted
for including the health effects caused by applying counter-
measures (such as physical injury caused by evacuation and
psychological detriments caused by the upheaval). Thus there
are direct health costs, indirect health costs (e.g. loss of salary
whilst recuperating), and non-market costs arising from the
anguish. It appears that there is no overall consensus in how
such health costs can be accounted for over both the short-
term and the long-term. The human capital (HC) approach
although simple is limited and outmoded as it is restricted
to considering the direct and indirect costs of the lost output
6 Restorative actions can have an overall beneﬁt by more than
compensating for a particular loss due to the accident. However,
it  may not be the optimal use of the funds when contrasted with
the situation if no accident had occurred (i.e. opportunity cost).
7 It must be noted that there may be alternative uses for the
land which may help preserve its value.
from the working production, whilst willingness to pay (WTP),
which allows for the inclusion of non-market costs, is difﬁcult
to evaluate. However, recent research has raised severe doubts
on the WTP  valuations used in the UK for the ﬁnding the value
of a prevented fatality (Thomas and Vaughan, 2015a,b,c) as
well as the validity of the concept in the context of radio-
logical protection (Thomas and Vaughan, 2013; Thomas and
Waddington, 2017a; Thomas, 2017a).
A more  modern and objective technique, the Judgement-
or J-value method (Thomas et al., 2006a,b; Thomas et al.,
2010) has now been developed, based on the life-quality index
(Nathwani and Lind, 1997; Nathwani et al., 2009). The J-value is
a revealed preference method that is able to place an objective
value on the increase in life expectancy that the safety mea-
sure brings about by balancing this against the utility that the
person being protected loses by his notional payment of the
cost of protection in line with the Kaldor–Hicks compensation
principle (Kaldor, 1939; Hicks, 1939). Rather than being reliant
on the subjective opinions of a small group of people, the J-
value is instead grounded in objective actuarial and economic
statistics that characterise the lives and behaviours of mil-
lions of citizens. Recently validated (Thomas, 2017b; Thomas
and Waddington, 2017b) the J-value allows immediate fatal-
ities and loss of life in the longer term (e.g. after exposure,
either of workers or of the general public, to nuclear radiation)
to be differentiated but measured on the same scale.
The J-value methodology has been applied as part of the
NREFS study (NREFS, 2017) to assess the relocation mea-
sures after Chernobyl and Fukushima Dai-ichi (Waddington
et al., 2017a), the remediation measures taken after those
two accidents (Waddington et al., 2017c) and the sheep meat
restrictions in the UK after Chernobyl (Waddington et al.,
2017b).
3.2.  Economic  modelling  in  the  UK
To assess these costs in a UK perspective, the COCO-2 model
developed by the Health Protection Agency (now Public Health
England) (Higgins et al., 2008), is included within the Level-3
Probabilistic Safety Assessment code “PACE” (Charnock et al.,
2013). COCO-2 uses an input-output methodology to repre-
sent the effect of lost production. The model accounts for
various economic activities in terms of Gross Value Added
(GVA) representing the beneﬁt that businesses provide on a
square-km basis, which are lost as a result of the accident.
It also accounts for losses in the supply chain caused by the
primary loss of GVA. Furthermore, direct and indirect health
costs are accounted for by including net output losses, the
costs of medical treatments, and WTP  costs for both fatalities
and morbidities.
The types of short-term and long-term countermeasures
that are included in COCO-2 are presented in Table 6. COCO-
2 does not account for costs of producing and distributing
iodine prophylactics, as such costs are typically low when
compared to the costs of sheltering, evacuation, and reloca-
tion; such costs would also need to account for the shelf-life
of such prophylactics which is typically given as 5 years. From
the 2004 US study (National Research Council, 2004) a range
of costs for producing and distributing stable iodine are seen.
This variation depends on how stable iodine is distributed (e.g.
door-to-door delivery cf. pick-up from a distribution centre); in
certain cases costs are approximately centred around $0.50 per
distributed tablet. Switzerland has recently brought in a new
emergency preparedness plan that involves pre-distributing
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Table 6 – Countermeasures and associated breakdown of
costs that are considered in the COCO-2 methodology, as
described further with formulae to calculate Gross Value
Added (GVA) in Higgins et al. (2008).
Action Losses
Sheltering Cost of lost GVAa
Evacuation Cost of population movementb
Cost of temp. accommodation and temporary
lost use of domestic assets
Cost of lost GVAa
Relocation Cost of population movement
Cost of temp. accommodation and temporary
lost use of domestic assets
Permanent loss of housing and domestic assets
Cost of lost GVAa
Loss of industrial buildings and assetsc
a Both direct and indirect business losses, and direct and indirect
tourism losses are accounted for.
b Cost of population movement for evacuation is not yet imple-
mented in PACE.
c Including capital value of industrial, commercial, and retail build-
ings.
stable iodine to everyone living within 50 km of a nuclear
power plant (4.6 million out of a total population of 8.1 million)
at a reported cost of $31 million (Bosley and Bennett, 2014).
Agricultural costs in COCO-2 account for various foodstuffs
with modiﬁers that attempt to incorporate any seasonality of
product into the GVA and output estimates generated. COCO-
2 also includes indirect losses, and the loss of capital stock.
It is noted that in an emergency situation, a wide range of
countermeasures are available, as outlined in the UK Recov-
ery Handbook (Health Protection Agency, 2009) and for such
a range of countermeasures, a wide range of costs estimates
can be derived (e.g. placing ferrocyn in animal feed that limits
137Cs transfer to milk which would be a cheaper countermea-
sure compared to slaughtering and disposing of livestock).
Further details of modelling the economic effects of a large
nuclear accident in the UK are provided in a companion paper
(Ashley et al., 2017).
4.  Factors  affecting  the  health  and
economic  costs  of  a  nuclear  accident
This section is concerned with a number of factors that will
inﬂuence signiﬁcantly the costs, in terms of both health and
economics, involved with a big nuclear accident. The ﬁrst
of these is the fundamental initial condition particular to
the nuclear plant, namely where it is sited, and how close
it lies to population centres (Section 4.1). A further initial
condition, this time speciﬁc to the accident, is the “source
term”, that comprises the quantity and isotopic constitution
of the nuclear material released, the time delay before the
release occurs and the duration of the release (Section 4.2).
The weather at the time of the accident (wind speed and direc-
tion, dry or wet weather) is an exogenous variable that will
then determine where the fallout is deposited (Section 4.3).
The ﬁnal factor is one that is to a large degree under the con-
trol of the authorities after a big nuclear accident, namely the
extent of the harvesting and sale of food from areas subject to
some degree of radioactive contamination (Section 4.4).
4.1.  Siting  and  demography
A complete account of the history on the siting of nuclear
power stations in the United Kingdom is provided in Grimston
et al. (2014). In summary, past differences in attitudes to the
siting nuclear power stations in the UK have occurred in four
phases.
In the ﬁrst phase (roughly 1945–1965, that included the
Magnox reactor programme) siting decisions were made with
considerable caution, with distance from populations being
a key driver of siting policy. In the second phase (roughly
1965–1985, which included the AGR programme), siting, with
regard to the density of local population, was more  relaxed
due to the belief that the safety and reliability of the reac-
tors had been signiﬁcantly improved. The third phase (roughly
1985–2005, which included the decision to build Sizewell B)
reverted back to conservative siting plans. The main reason
was the PWR  technology was new to the UK, but other factors
played a part such as the accidents at TMI-2 and Chernobyl,
In the fourth phase (2005 onwards) a more  positive attitude
toward siting of future nuclear plants is observed, due to
greater public and political support even after the accident at
Fukushima Dai-ichi, although all the approved sites (with one
exception) are those already used for nuclear power plants.
One of the earliest tools to account for the impact on the
public located near a nuclear power station was developed
by Farmer, who developed a methodology that considered the
trade-off between the frequency and consequence of an acci-
dent occurring (Farmer, 1967). This work indicated that the
relative risk for a remote site compared to a hypothetical
‘town’ is approximately a factor of 10 lower; and the rela-
tive risk for a remote site compared to a hypothetical ‘city’
is approximately a factor of 100 lower. Subsequent work has
noted that certain risk factors may be increased at a remote
site (compared to a ‘town’ or ‘city’ site), such as less reliable
grid interconnections due to longer transmission lines. Since
this report, probabilistic safety assessments (Fullwood, 1999),
notably Level-3 PSAs as outlined in OECD-NEA, (2000), have
been developed further to both ascertain the probabilities and
corresponding consequences of various accident sequences
for various reactor technologies.
Present UK policy has involved the use of strategic siting
assessments to look at potential sites for new nuclear reac-
tors in the UK (DECC, 2011a,b). The strategic siting assessment
includes twelve factors that were used in aiding the decision
to grant development consent, including:
(1) demographics;
(2) proximity to military activities;
(3) ﬂooding, tsunami and storm surge;
(4) coastal processes;
(5) proximity to hazardous industrial facilities and opera-
tions;
(6) proximity to civil aircraft movements;
(7) internationally designated sites of ecological importance;
(8) nationally designated sites of ecological importance;
(9) areas of amenity, cultural heritage and landscape value;
(10) size of site to accommodate operation;
(11) access to suitable sources of cooling;
(12) capability of the site to store spent fuel and intermediate
level waste.
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It should be noted that the population around the nuclear
facility is not uniform and varies throughout the year; also,
certain demographics will be affected and will behave in differ-
ent ways. For instance, for a speciﬁc incident, young families
may be encouraged to evacuate whereas the elderly and inﬁrm
may be advised against evacuating. Self-evacuation is almost
impossible to gauge, but is almost certainly going to happen
in societies where access to personal transport is high, e.g.
self-evacuation following the accident at TMI-2 whereas the
evacuation of Pripyat following the accident at Chernobyl was
organised by the authorities. Additional variability will depend
on the nature of the surroundings, whether there are hos-
pitals, schools, homes, etc.: and depend on what people are
doing at the time of the incident, i.e. inside or outside build-
ings, in home or away from home.
4.2.  Source  terms
As alluded to earlier, the consequence of an event occurring is
not just the number of people who may be affected but how
they are affected. From a radiological stand-point, this centres
on the quantities of radionuclides released over the timeframe
of the accident, referred to as the ‘source term’.
As there are various different accidents that can occur at
a nuclear power plant, there are different modes in which
nuclear material may be released that affect: (1) the quan-
tities of radionuclides being released (generally described in
terms of its activity), (2) the duration of pre-release (i.e. the
time between the initial alarm and the release occurring), and
(3) the duration of the release. For the accident of Chernobyl
5300 PBq of activity (excluding noble gases) was released,
whereas for Fukushima Dai-ichi 520 (340–780) PBq of activity
was released (Steinhauser et al., 2014). A summary of source
terms for other nuclear incidents can be found in Sanderson
et al. (1997).
It is worth noting here that there is no direct relationship
between the overall amount of activity released and the dose
received – the isotopic composition, the physical form and its
exposure pathway (e.g. external “shine” from the ground or
the air, ingestion, and inhalation) are all signiﬁcant factors.
Such conversion factors for each radionuclide are provided
by the International Commission for Radiological Protection
(Eckerman et al., 2013).
Other factors that can affect the severity of the source term
are: whether the release is airborne or liquid in nature; the
height of the release; and the energy (or heat) in the release.
4.3.  Weather  and  dispersion
For airborne releases, weather plays a signiﬁcant role in how
radionuclides are dispersed. There are several factors here
that affect how radionuclides disperse including: wind speed,
atmospheric turbulence (typically, in the past, described by
Pasquill atmospheric stability classes (Pasquill, 1961)), and
precipitation. These may vary over the release time, as high-
lighted by the release pattern seen at Fukushima Dai-ichi,
shown in Figs. 1 and 2. In general statistics on these aspects
is available so as for the source term a statistical conﬁdence
level can be considered (though in this case on the basis of real
statistics). A factor that inﬂuences weather is the time of year
and the time of day, but it should be possible to include these
in the statistical analysis.
The earliest dispersion models that have been used
focussed on two-dimensional Gaussian techniques to char-
acterise plumes; with two dispersion parameters used to
approximate cross-winds and vertical winds, essentially ﬁxed
at the point of release, though some variation was possible by
restarting calculations after some time. The outputs of such a
code are given in the form of a series of graphs in the report
NRPB-R91, (now Public Health England) (Clarke, 1979). More
sophisticated codes have since been developed, such as the
UK Met  Ofﬁce NAME III program (Jones et al., 2007) that uses
Lagrangian modelling in three dimensions to calculate the
behaviour of plumes, which allows actual meteorological data
to be used, though these require more  computing power and
are typically much more  computationally expensive.8 A report
by OECD-NEA (2000) discussed some aspects of emergency
management codes as they were at that time.
It is important, however, to recognise that a pre-event cal-
culation can only give a probabilistic view by compiling a set of
calculations for different weather conditions derived from var-
ious meteorological data, which may be used in planning. For
example, it will indicate the likely extent of areas for speciﬁc
countermeasures, which as the ﬁgures show are not uniformly
distributed about the site. This will also indicate the likely
costs which can be included in calculations of whether safety
measures need to be improved. During an event, the weather
type and direction may change and it is unlikely that it will
match any of the pre-event scenarios. Thus, emergency pre-
paredness plans must be ﬂexible enough to deal with real-time
changes. The use of a code such as PACE may be used at this
stage to predict behaviour, but this will require some way of
postulating the source term also.
4.4.  Food
The ﬁnal major aspect concerns food. As the radioactive mate-
rial is deposited it will move into the food cycle (and can affect
sources of water). Besides what is grown in people’s gardens,
there is likely to be large areas which, even if for only a short
time, will have bans on the sale (and hence distribution of)
food both animal and vegetable. Two examples from UK expe-
rience are the banning of milk in Cumbria (then Cumberland)
in 1957 for about a month in the vicinity of the plant, following
the Windscale Piles accident (Arnold, 1992) and the long-term
restrictions on sheep following the Chernobyl accident which
continued for some UK farms for over 25 years (Waddington
et al., 2017b). Clearly, as above, the time of year and, to a more
limited extent the time of day, are both important factors. The
levels of radiation in food which cause them to be banned also
need to be established. Further details on how radionuclides
enter the food-chain and how this is modelled can be found
in Till and Grogan (2008).
5.  Conclusions
The accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi has highlighted and rein-
forced the need for emergency preparedness and response
plans to be prepared prior to the operation of any nuclear
8 Gaussian dispersion models treat the dispersed pollutant as
having a Gaussian distribution, (i.e. a normal probability
distribution). Lagrangian dispersion models treat the dispersed
pollutant as individual packets (i.e. particles) that move via a
random walk in the atmosphere. A discussion of the practical
differences between these dispersion models can be found in
Haywood (2011).
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facilities that have the potential to release material to the
environment.
This paper has reviewed, from a UK perspective, the role
of emergency preparedness and response plans, drawing on
information from both Chernobyl and Fukushima Dai-ichi.
The phases of a nuclear accident leading to an off-site release
have been considered, and a review has been provided of the
measures that can be adopted at each phase to mitigate effects
on the public. The current UK approach has been examined,
and a comparison has been made of UK and international
stances.
It is clear that a second major reactor accident has spurred
efforts nationally and internationally to improve ways of cop-
ing with a big nuclear accident, should it happen. New analysis
methods are emerging, and, in parallel, international com-
mittees of experts are attempting to reﬁne the advice offered
to governments who might face a large reactor accident in
the future. One potential concern is the desire for too great a
level of prescription, which might conﬂict with the degree of
ﬂexibility required by the fundamental principles of radiolog-
ical protection as enunciated by the ICRP, speciﬁcally those
of “justiﬁcation” and “optimization”. We  observe also that
it is necessary to consider societal effects, economic effects
and non-radiological health effects in addition to radiologi-
cal harm when drawing up plans and taking decisions after a
major nuclear accident. The lesson from both Chernobyl and
Fukushima Dai-ichi is that while great resources were put in
place to keep radiation harm to the public to a very low level,
this might have been at the expense of psychological and gen-
eral health.
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